Moneyball Article

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This was in today's Toronto Star, and even though I don't agree with most of what's written, I still thought it was an interesting read and that it would be nice to see some people respond to it.

 

It's time to turn the page on Moneyball theories

A's Kendall trade a case in point

Holes appear in interesting book

 

 

GEOFF BAKER

SPORTS REPORTER

 

It was only a year ago that the baseball book Moneyball was ringing up pre-Christmas sales with intriguing theories behind how to win on a budget.

 

But so much has changed in the past 12 months, culminating last weekend with the final shovel of dirt being thrown over those theories by the very man whose work inspired author Michael Lewis to write his best-seller in the first place. On Saturday, Oakland A's general manager Billy Beane completed a trade with the Pittsburgh Pirates that brought catcher Jason Kendall to the team that prides itself on seeking value.

 

Kendall is owed $34 million (all figures U.S.) in salary over the next three seasons. While Beane did shed $15 million in salary commitments by shipping pitchers Arthur Rhodes and Mark Redman to the Pirates — and will net another $3 million in cash payouts.The most striking thing about the Kendall deal is that Beane opted for the trade rather than signing Blue Jays free-agent Gregg Zaun to step in behind the plate. Now Zaun is no Kendall, but even at a hefty raise to his $400,000 salary from last season, he seems the epitome of the low-budget, undervalued position replacement that Lewis so championed in his book.

 

Lewis's summation of how the A's won three straight division titles from 2000 to 2002 while losing marquee players Jason Giambi and Johnny Damon was straightforward: assemble an offence of low-cost, undervalued hitters whose high on-base percentages and walk-rates could generate the same run totals as pricier players with lofty batting averages and premium defensive skills.

 

It was a theory that electrified so many baseball fans and media pundits quick to jump on the next big trend. Trouble is, as time wore on, it became a theory shot full of holes as those who'd followed baseball closely began to question the wisdom spouted on the book's pages.

 

The biggest hole was the book downplaying the impact of Big Three starting pitchers Tim Hudson, Mark Mulder and Barry Zito on the A's success. Anyone who crunched the numbers from 2000 to 2003 would have seen a gradual decline in Oakland's offensive production coinciding with a sharp rise in the Big Three's fortunes.

 

In other words, a book could have just as easily been written about how the key to winning on a budget is to gather three potential Cy Young Award winners and use any remaining cash on assembling a mediocre offence. That's not as sexy as the Moneyball premise, but arguably more accurate as Beane wrestles with what to do now that the Big Three are heading towards free-agent status.

 

The idea that at least one of the pitchers will leave Oakland is gaining steam and Beane seems to be countering by leaning towards the star talent so many winning teams have used before. That's not a knock on Beane, who still wins more while spending less than other GMs and shows an ability to admit mistakes by jettisoning players — Redman and Rhodes in this case — who don't pan out.

 

But the acquisition of Kendall on the heels of a six-year, $66-million contract given to third baseman Eric Chavez suggests an A's strategy quite different from "assembling nobodies into a ruthlessly efficient machine for winning ball games'' as Moneyball claimed had been done with Scott Hatteberg, Terrence Long and other lesser names it so championed.

 

The idea that Moneyball could be used as a blueprint by low-budget teams went up in smoke in 2004. In Toronto, the Blue Jays under J.P. Ricciardi had their worst season in a quarter century while employing the same $50-million (U.S.) payroll the A's had used in 2003.

 

Toronto lacked at least two of the Big Three starting pitchers to accompany ace Roy Halladay and also badly needed the type of closer Oakland had in Keith Foulke during its 2003 run.

 

The Moneyball claim that "it was more efficient to create a closer than to buy one" and that "established closers were systematically overpriced" took a huge hit in 2004 as Foulke signed with the Boston Red Sox and was instrumental in their World Series title. It's worth noting that the final four playoff teams had three of the game's highest priced closers in Foulke, Jason Isringhausen and Mariano Rivera.

 

The A's, meanwhile, in their first season without Foulke, were victimized all year by late-game bullpen collapses.

 

Even the so-called "Moneyball GMs" who went to the playoffs in 2004, Theo Epstein in Boston and Paul DePodesta in Los Angeles, did so with opening day payrolls of $127 million and $93 million, respectively. That would seem to automatically disqualify both as Moneyball practitioners since the book is all about winning at a low cost.

 

Epstein further undermined the book with his brilliant mid-season trade that sent star shortstop Nomar Garciaparra to the Chicago Cubs and landed Gold Glove shortstop Orlando Cabrera and first baseman Doug Mientkiewicz. While Moneyball states that defensive skills are overvalued and far less important than offensive ones, Epstein's sacrificing of Garciaparra's power bat in return for gloves helped lower his pitching staff's earned run average and pushed Boston into the playoffs.

 

Moneyball will still go down in history as an interesting book that popularized statistical theories of men like Bill James and opened the minds of baseball followers to ideas that go against the grain. But some of the sharpest minds running teams appear to have recognized that the book's main thesis — that the A's won with a $50 million budget by outsmarting competitors on the cheap with a no-name offence — falls woefully short.

[EVIL~! alkeiper 0]

I find it very interesting that a team that espouses a new philosophy can have entire books written about them, and yet still completely talk out of their ass when writing about them.

 

This is honestly a bunch of crap. The idea of Moneyball is NOT simply to acquire low cost players. Nor is it to assemble a killer offense. The idea is to find players who have been undervalued by the market, and avoid seeking skills which contribute little to winning baseball games. If Eric Chavez or Jason Kendall is worth the money, it is worth paying them. If the ideal is to assemble a pitching staff, then that is how you win baseball games.

 

The Oakland Athletics won 91 games last year, missing the playoffs by a single win. Had they not lost Mark Ellis to injury, its quite probable they could have won the division (which not many people predicted). Is the offense mediocre? It's middle of the pack. But that is not a failure of Moneyball. Could Mr. Baker have produced a better offense without Moneyball types, on a budget? I highly doubt it.

 

Of course the Oakland A's will have their shortcomings. They are a small market team. The idea that they will dominate with their strategies is nonsense. Their goal is to compete, and given their fifth straight season of ninety wins, they have done an admireable job of it.

 

As for Mr. Baker, perhaps he can go back to inflaming Moneyball and Bill James by writing more shit about how the Blue Jays are racists. His anti-intelligence rants on the Blue Jays border on maddening, and it is clear he holds an agenda against Billy Beane, Bill James, and their ilk. Perhaps if he did his time researching, instead of blathering with the good ole boys network, he might learn a thing or two. Instead, I'll just quote the final paragraph of Moneyball...

 

But he has his own moment, this fellow.  When he sits down to write his column he knows in his heart that he speaks for a lot of people who work just off the field of play.  He may only belong to the Women's Auxiliary, but his view of the game reflects those of actual Club members.  A lot of people who make the decisions about building baseball teams think a lot like he does.  That's why it's possible, on the field of play, for a team with no money to win so many games.

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Does Moneyball outright say offense is more important than defense?

[EVIL~! alkeiper 0]

Does Moneyball outright say offense is more important than defense?

 

There's two ways of looking at it. If by defense you mean pitching and fielding, then no, its a 50/50 split. If it is an individual player, then almost always his offense is more important than his defense. What Moneyball states is that the A's feel they can attach a real value to defense, and judge their roster decisions accordingly. So instead of simply saying "Rey Ordonez is an invaluable defender," they make real judgements on defense, the same way you might judge offense.