Key Findings of the Duefler/ISG/WMD Report

[Guest Cerebus]

*warning, long ass post*

 

Since you'll probably hearing endlessly about it in the coming weeks (and since your tax dollars paid for it if you're American) I figured its good that you read the primary document itself. The whole report (all 1000+ pages of it) can be found here. (Note that in the interest of space, I'm only posting the material that's bolded in the document itself so none of it is my emphasis). As a result, some of the parts can be a little confusing if you take it out of the context of the rest of the report, so you should read all of the key findings anyway.

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Regime Strategic Intent

Key Findings

Saddam Husayn so dominated the Iraqi Regime that its strategic intent was his alone. He wanted to end

sanctions while preserving the capability to reconstitute his weapons of mass destruction (WMD) when

sanctions were lifted.

Saddam totally dominated the Regime’s strategic decision making.

Saddam’s primary goal from 1991 to 2003 was to have UN sanctions lifted, while maintaining the security

of the Regime.

The introduction of the Oil-For-Food program (OFF) in late 1996 was a key turning point for the Regime.

By 2000-2001, Saddam had managed to mitigate many of the effects of sanctions and undermine their

international support.

Saddam wanted to recreate Iraq’s WMD capability—which was essentially destroyed in 1991—after sanctions

were removed and Iraq’s economy stabilized, but probably with a different mix of capabilities to that

which previously existed. Saddam aspired to develop a nuclear capability—in an incremental fashion,

irrespective of international pressure and the resulting economic risks—but he intended to focus on ballistic

missile and tactical chemical warfare (CW) capabilities.

Iran was the pre-eminent motivator of this policy.

Iraq Survey Group (ISG) judges that events in the 1980s and early 1990s shaped Saddam’s belief in the

value of WMD.

• The former Regime had no formal written strategy or plan for the revival of WMD after sanctions.

 

Regime Finance

and Procure

Key Findings

Throughout the 1990s and up to OIF (March 2003), Saddam focused on one set of objectives: the survival of

himself, his Regime, and his legacy. To secure those objectives, Saddam needed to exploit Iraqi oil assets, to

portray a strong military capability to deter internal and external threats, and to foster his image as an Arab

leader. Saddam recognized that the reconstitution of Iraqi WMD enhanced both his security and image. Consequently,

Saddam needed to end UN-imposed sanctions to fulfi ll his goals.

Saddam severely under estimated the economic and military costs of invading Iran in 1980 and Kuwait in

1990, as well as underestimating the subsequent international condemnation of his invasion of Kuwait. He did

not anticipate this condemnation, nor the subsequent imposition, comprehensiveness, severity, and longevity

of UN sanctions. His initial belief that UN sanctions would not last, resulting in his country’s economic

decline, changed by 1998 when the UNSC did not lift sanctions after he believed resolutions were fulfi lled.

Although Saddam had reluctantly accepted the UN’s Oil for Food (OFF) program by 1996, he soon recognized

its economic value and additional opportunities for further manipulation and infl uence of the UNSC Iraq

661 Sanctions Committee member states. Therefore, he resigned himself to the continuation of UN sanctions

understanding that they would become a “paper tiger” regardless of continued US resolve to maintain them.

Throughout sanctions, Saddam continually directed his advisors to formulate and implement strategies, policies,

and methods to terminate the UN’s sanctions regime established by UNSCR 661. The Regime devised an

effective diplomatic and economic strategy of generating revenue and procuring illicit goods utilizing the Iraqi

intelligence, banking, industrial, and military apparatus that eroded United Nations’ member states and other

international players’ resolve to enforce compliance, while capitalizing politically on its humanitarian crisis.

According to Saddam and his senior advisors, the UN, at the behest of the US, placed an economic

strangle hold on Iraq.

Under Saddam’s orders, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

(MFA) formulated and implemented a strategy aimed at these UNSC members and international public

opinion with the purpose of ending UN sanctions and undermining its subsequent OFF program by diplomatic

and economic means.

The Regime fi nanced these government-sanctioned programs by several illicit revenue streams that

amassed more that $11 billion from the early 1990s to OIF outside the UN-approved methods.

Saddam used the IIS (Iraqi Intelligence Service) to undertake the most sensitive procurement missions. Consequently, the IIS facilitated

the import of UN sanctioned and dual-use goods into Iraq through countries like Syria, Jordan,

Belarus and Turkey.

Saddam personally approved and removed all names of voucher recipients. He made all modifi cations to the list, adding or deleting names at will.

 

Delivery Systems

Key Findings

Since the early 1970s, Iraq has consistently sought to acquire an effective long-range weapons delivery

capability, and by 1991 Baghdad had purchased the missiles and infrastructure that would form the basis

for nearly all of its future missile system developments.

Iraq’s experiences with long-range delivery systems in the Iran/Iraq war were a vital lesson to Iraqi President

Saddam Husayn.

By 1991, Iraq had successfully demonstrated its ability to modify some of its delivery systems to increase

their range and to develop WMD dissemination options, with the Al Husayn being a fi rst step in this direction.

Iraq failed in its efforts to acquire longer-range delivery systems to replace inventory exhausted in the

Iran/Iraq war.

Desert Storm and subsequent UN resolutions and inspections brought many of Iraq’s delivery system

programs to a halt. While much of Iraq’s long-range missile inventory and production infrastructure was

eliminated, Iraq until late 1991 kept some items hidden to assist future reconstitution of the force.

It appears to have taken time, but Iraq eventually realized that sanctions were not going to end quickly.

The Iraq Survey Group (ISG) has uncovered no evidence Iraq retained Scud-variant missiles, and debriefings

of Iraqi offi cials in addition to some documentation suggest that Iraq did not retain such missiles

after 1991.This positioned Iraq for a potential breakout capability.

Iraq’s decisions in 1996 to accept the Oil-For-Food program (OFF) and later in 1998 to cease cooperation

with UNSCOM and IAEA spurred a period of increased activity in delivery systems development.

By 2002, Iraq had provided the liquid-propellant Al Samud II—a program started in 2001—and the solidpropellant

Al Fat’h to the military and was pursuing a series of new small UAV systems.

ISG uncovered Iraqi plans or designs for three long-range ballistic missiles with ranges from 400 to 1,000

km and for a 1,000-km-range cruise missile, although none of these systems progressed to production and

only one reportedly passed the design phase. ISG assesses that these plans demonstrate Saddam’s continuing

desire—up to the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)—for a long-range delivery capability.

Procurements supporting delivery system programs expanded after the 1998 departure of the UN inspectors.

Iraq also hired outside expertise to assist its development programs.

In late 2002 Iraq was under increasing pressure from the international community to allow UN inspectors

to return.

Given Iraq’s investments in technology and infrastructure improvements, an effective procurement network,

skilled scientists, and designs already on the books for longer range missiles, ISG assesses that Saddam

clearly intended to reconstitute long-range delivery systems and that the systems potentially were for WMD.

 

Nuclear

Key Findings

Iraq Survey Group (ISG) discovered further evidence of the maturity and signifi cance of the pre-1991

Iraqi Nuclear Program but found that Iraq’s ability to reconstitute a nuclear weapons program progressively

decayed after that date.

Nevertheless, after 1991, Saddam did express his intent to retain the intellectual capital developed

during the Iraqi Nuclear Program.

Initially, Saddam chose to conceal his nuclear program in its entirety, as he did with Iraq’s BW program.

Aggressive UN inspections after Desert Storm forced Saddam to admit the existence of the program

and destroy or surrender components of the program.

In the wake of Desert Storm, Iraq took steps to conceal key elements of its program and to preserve

what it could of the professional capabilities of its nuclear scientifi c community.

As with other WMD areas, Saddam’s ambitions in the nuclear area were secondary to his prime objective

of ending UN sanctions.

ISG found a limited number of post-1995 activities that would have aided the reconstitution of the

nuclear weapons program once sanctions were lifted.

 

Chemical Chemical

Key Findings

Saddam never abandoned his intentions to resume a CW effort when sanctions were lifted and conditions

were judged favorable:

While a small number of old, abandoned chemical munitions have been discovered, ISG judges that Iraq

unilaterally destroyed its undeclared chemical weapons stockpile in 1991.

Iraq’s CW program was crippled by the Gulf war and the legitimate chemical industry, which suffered under

sanctions, only began to recover in the mid-1990s. Subsequent changes in the management of key military

and civilian organizations, followed by an infl ux of funding and resources, provided Iraq with the ability to

reinvigorate its industrial base.

The way Iraq organized its chemical industry after the mid-1990s allowed it to conserve the knowledge-base

needed to restart a CW program, conduct a modest amount of dual-use research, and partially recover from

the decline of its production capability caused by the effects of the Gulf war and UN-sponsored destruction

and sanctions. Iraq implemented a rigorous and formalized system of nationwide research and production

of chemicals, but ISG will not be able to resolve whether Iraq intended the system to underpin any CWrelated

efforts.

Iraq constructed a number of new plants starting in the mid-1990s that enhanced its chemical infrastructure,

although its overall industry had not fully recovered from the effects of sanctions, and had not

regained pre-1991 technical sophistication or production capabilities prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom

(OIF).

Iraq’s historical ability to implement simple solutions to weaponization challenges allowed Iraq to retain the

capability to weaponize CW agent when the need arose. Because of the risk of discovery and consequences

for ending UN sanctions, Iraq would have signifi cantly jeopardized its chances of having sanctions lifted or

no longer enforced if the UN or foreign entity had discovered that Iraq had undertaken any weaponization

activities.

Saddam’s Leadership Defense Plan consisted of a tactical doctrine taught to all Iraqi offi cers and included

the concept of a “red-line” or last line of defense.

Discussions concerning WMD, particularly leading up to OIF, would have been highly compartmentalized

within the Regime. ISG found no credible evidence that any fi eld elements knew about plans for CW use

during Operation Iraqi Freedom.

ISG uncovered information that the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) maintained throughout 1991 to 2003

a set of undeclared covert laboratories to research and test various chemicals and poisons, primarily for

intelligence operations.

ISG investigated a series of key pre-OIF indicators involving the possible movement and storage of chemical

weapons, focusing on 11 major depots assessed to have possible links to CW. A review of documents,

interviews, available reporting, and site exploitations revealed alternate, plausible explanations for activities

noted prior to OIF which, at the time, were believed to be CW-related.

 

Biological

Key Findings

The Biological Warfare (BW) program was born of the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) and this service

retained its connections with the program either directly or indirectly throughout its existence.

In 1991, Saddam Husayn regarded BW as an integral element of his arsenal of WMD weapons, and would

have used it if the need arose.

ISG judges that Iraq’s actions between 1991 and 1996 demonstrate that the state intended to preserve its

BW capability and return to a steady, methodical progress toward a mature BW program when and if the

opportunity arose.

In practical terms, with the destruction of the Al Hakam facility, Iraq abandoned its ambition to obtain

advanced BW weapons quickly. ISG found no direct evidence that Iraq, after 1996, had plans for a new BW

program or was conducting BW-specifi c work for military purposes.

Iraq would have faced great diffi culty in re-establishing an effective BW agent production capability. Nevertheless,

after 1996 Iraq still had a signifi cant dual-use capability—some declared—readily useful for BW

if the Regime chose to use it to pursue a BW program. Moreover, Iraq still possessed its most important BW

asset, the scientifi c know-how of its BW cadre.

 

Depending on its scale, Iraq could have re-established an elementary BW program within a few weeks to a

few months of a decision to do so, but ISG discovered no indications that the Regime was pursuing such a

course.

ISG judges that in 1991 and 1992, Iraq appears to have destroyed its undeclared stocks of BW weapons

and probably destroyed remaining holdings of bulk BW agent. However ISG lacks evidence to document

complete destruction. Iraq retained some BW-related seed stocks until their discovery after Operation Iraqi

Freedom (OIF).

The IIS had a series of laboratories that conducted biological work including research into BW agents for

assassination purposes until the mid-1990s. ISG has not been able to establish the scope and nature of the

work at these laboratories or determine whether any of the work was related to military development of BW

agent.

In spite of exhaustive investigation, ISG found no evidence that Iraq possessed, or was developing BW agent

production systems mounted on road vehicles or railway wagons.

[snuffbox 0]

You were right, Cerebus...a very longass post. I appreciate the post of the highlights though.

 

Is there any way to obtain a printed version of the full report?

[Guest Cerebus]

I put a link to the full report (here it is again) so you can find whatever you need there but I don't really know if you'd need a FOIA (Freedom of Information Act) petition to get a printed copy from the CIA or not. You're better off printing out only the parts you need if you wanted a hard copy.

[snuffbox 0]

I checked out the link...I just dont have a printer.