Blair dodges all Iraq Questions

[Guest INXS]

They did?! I can't continue this...i've offered a compromise and accepted various possibilities...try thinking by yourself sometime...

[Guest MikeSC]

They did?! I can't continue this...i've offered a compromise and accepted various possibilities...try thinking by yourself sometime...

INXS, name one country who said that Iraq didn't have WMD's PRIOR to all of this.

-=Mike

...Hell, the UN said he had them...

[Guest BDC]

The fact of the matter is that neither side of this debate believes that the other CAN think for itself.

 

You can't believe I'm blind enough to believe that they were there. I can't believe you're blind enough to think they weren't.

[Guest INXS]

No, the UN DIDN'T. UN inspectors wanted more time.

 

I don't care which countries thought he had WMD, I don't even care if the UN thought he had WMD..I think for myself and after years of inspections and to date no WMD find I can firmly say I was right to believe that there wasn't any or that Saddam posed a threat to the UK.

[Guest MikeSC]

No, the UN DIDN'T. UN inspectors wanted more time.

 

I don't care which countries thought he had WMD, I don't even care if the UN thought he had WMD..I think for myself and after years of inspections and to date no WMD find I can firmly say I was right to believe that there wasn't any or that Saddam posed a threat to the UK.

INXS, explain the SEVENTEEN RESOLUTIONS PASSED that dealt SPECIFICALLY with WMD.

 

Why did Saddam toss out inspectors in the first place?

-=Mike

[Guest INXS]

I don't know why he did that. Perhaps frustration, perhaps anger. If he had WMD I think he would have used it don't you?

 

As for the UN...i'll take your word on that one. The inspectors wanted more time, that I do know...and also that no WMD has been found..infact not a trace.

[Justice 0]

I don't know why he did that. Perhaps frustration, perhaps anger. If he had WMD I think he would have used it don't you?

 

As for the UN...i'll take your word on that one. The inspectors wanted more time, that I do know...and also that no WMD has been found..infact not a trace.

Bullshit.

 

The Sarin gas shell, old chemical weapons rockets, plans for long range rocket programs and other support programs for the delivery and creation of these weapons sort of disproves you.

[Vyce 0]

I don't know why he did that. Perhaps frustration, perhaps anger. If he had WMD I think he would have used it don't you?

 

As for the UN...i'll take your word on that one. The inspectors wanted more time, that I do know...and also that no WMD has been found..infact not a trace.

I KNOW you're not this dense. I just know it. I have to believe this. I don't know why you're being this naive.

 

Yes, everyone, INCLUDING THE UN, said that he had them. YES, THEY DID. The issue was NEVER about whether he had them, because EVERYONE believed that he did - the issue was whether the U.N. inspectors could find all of the weapons and dismantle them. THAT is what the weapons inspectors were trying to determine - how much he had, where he had the goods hidden, etc. And those who opposed the war did so on the premise that we should give the inspectors more time to disarm Saddam rather than disarm him through war.

 

And not a trace? Let's not rewrite history here. Hell, right up until the start of the war Saddam was destroying, for example, rockets / rocket systems that were illegal and he was supposed to have demolished years prior.

 

Come on. It's not as if this was ancient history - it happened just a year and a half ago.

[Guest GreatOne]

Do you think that WMD is in Iraq and we just haven't stumbled across any yet?

Has it occurred to some people that we've been a tad busy in Iraq for like the last year plus to look for "large stacks".

 

Of course maybe the fact that we've found weapons that Saddam, you know, WASN'T SUPPOSED TO HAVE, might be lost on you.

[Guest INXS]

The findings of Lord Butler's inquiry...

 

Lord Butler's inquiry has published its verdict on the intelligence used to justify the war against Iraq. Here are the main points.

 

The reliability of intelligence

 

 

Doubt has been cast on a "high proportion" of human intelligence sources - and so on the quality of intelligence assessments given to ministers and officials

 

The problems were partly caused by weaknesses in the way MI6 carried out its checks on sources

 

There was third hand reporting of information about Iraqi chemical and biological weapons -with a sub-source reporting to a second MI6 main source

 

One MI6 source reported authoritatively on some issues but on others was "passing on what he had heard within his circle"

 

Reports from a third MI6 main source have been withdrawn as unreliable

 

Information from another country's intelligence agency on Iraqi production of biological and chemical agents "were seriously flawed" and the grounds for British assessments that Iraq had recently produced such stocks "no longer exist"

 

There was no "over-reliance" on dissent Iraqi sources

 

Iraqi weapons

 

 

It would be rash to say now that no evidence of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction programmes will ever be found

 

Before the war Iraq wanted to get banned weapons, including a nuclear programme

 

Iraq was developing ballistic missiles with a longer range than allowed

 

It did not have significant, if any, stocks of chemical or biological weapons in a state fit for use, or developed plans for using them.

 

The war decision

 

 

There was "no recent intelligence" to lead people to conclude Iraq was of more immediate concern than other countries, although its history prompted the view there needed to be a threat of force to ensure Saddam Hussein's compliance

 

The inquiry is surprised ministers, officials, and intelligence agencies did not reassess the quality of intelligence as UN weapons inspectors failed to make finds in the months immediately before the war

 

Intelligence only played a "limited" role in determining the legality of the war

 

No evidence was found that Britain went to war to secure continued access to oil supplies

The 45-minute claim

 

The claim that Iraq could use weapons of mass destruction within 45 minutes was should not have been made in the government's weapons dossier without explaining what the claim referred to

 

MI6 now says the intelligence report on the claim "has come into question", with doubts cast about one of the links in the reporting chain

 

 

Uranium from Niger

 

 

British intelligence on the claim that Iraq had sought uranium from Niger was "credible". There was not conclusive evidence Iraq actually purchased the material, nor did the government make that claim.

Mobile biological weapons laboratories

 

 

It was "reasonable" for intelligence chiefs to report about Iraq seeking more mobile biological weapons labs

 

But the intelligence from the source did not show Iraq had recently produced stocks of biological agents

 

This evidence could not have existed if MI6 had talked to the source directly from 2000 onwards.

 

The weapons dossier

 

 

"A serious weakness" was that the intelligence chiefs' warnings about the limitations of their judgements were not made clear enough

 

Judgements in the dossier "went to (although not beyond) the outer limits of the intelligence available"

 

The impression there was "firmer and fuller" intelligence backing up the dossier was reinforced when Tony Blair told MPs on its publication day the picture painted by intelligence agencies was "extensive, detailed and authoritative"

 

Joint Intelligence committee (JIC)

 

 

No evidence has been found of "deliberate distortion or of culpable negligence"

 

In general, original intelligence was reported correctly in JIC assessments, with the exception of the 45-minute claim

 

An intelligence report important in drafting the dossier should have been shown to key experts in the Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS), who were right to raise concerns

 

JIC chairman John Scarlett should not withdraw from taking up his new job as director of MI6

 

There is a strong case for future JIC chairmen being people with experience of dealing with ministers in very senior roles and being "demonstrably beyond influence" and so probably in their last post.

 

The workings of government

 

 

The inquiry team is concerned about the "informality" of government procedures reduced the "scope for informed collective political judgement" - a reference to cabinet decision making

 

Other countries of concern

 

 

Uncovering Libya's weapons programmes was a "major intelligence success"

 

The dismantlement of Pakistan nuclear scientist AQ Khan's efforts to sell nuclear technologies to countries of concern is a "remarkable tribute" to the work of the intelligence agencies, with good cooperation between US and UK agencies

 

It is difficult to get intelligence about North Korea but the agencies' ingenious tactics have provided important insights on exports of missile delivery systems.

 

Intelligence work in Iran, North Korea, Libya and the AQ Khan problem show the importance of exploiting links between supplies and buyers when fighting weapons proliferation.

 

These "success stories" also show there can be "lucky breaks" but they come from the foundation of knowledge developed over several years and close collaboration between all involved.

Terrorism

 

 

All British intelligence agencies are developing new techniques and there is "clear evidence" they are cooperating at all levels

 

The Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre has proved a success after working for more than a year

 

International collaboration on counter-terrorism has been significantly improved in the last six or seven years

 

The inquiry team is worried the procedures of the international community "are still not sufficiently aligned to match the threat" of terrorism

Osama Bin Laden

 

 

In January 2000, the Joint Intelligence Committee said Bin Laden had some toxic chemical or biological materials and an understanding of their use. But there was no hard intelligence he owned genuine nuclear material

 

A JIC assessment in 1999 said one of Bin Laden's followers claimed Bin Laden "intended to attack US and UK targets in India, Indonesia and the US, by using means which even the US could not counter, implying the use of chemical or biological material".