My Final Exam

[Big Ol' Smitty 0]

These are the three questions that constituted my final exam for a class I'm taking on national security (we had to do one). Thought they might, perhaps, generate some discussion here. I think Xavier C. would be especially interested in question #1.

 

1. Do pirates represent a threat to the national security of the United States? Why or why not? What kind of resources (military and diplomatic) should the United States marshal in the fight against piracy, if any?

 

2. In the face of an expected Taliban winter offensive, the United States military has begun to retrench around the Afghan capitol of Kabul. Should the US and the Afghan government consider direct talks with the Taliban? Why or why not?

 

3. The Mumbai attacks may provide what Joe Biden called an early “test” for President Obama. What US national security interests are at stake in the dispute over the attacks? What diplomatic and military resources can the United States use in order to effect a positive outcome?

 

 

P.S. This is not the same class that I had the Godzilla crisis simulation in, but the same prof. I did question #2.

[snuffbox 0]

How'd you answer?

[Big Ol' Smitty 0]

How'd you answer?

 

The United States’ position in the war in Afghanistan seems to have reached its nadir. An influx of Marines into the country and a retrenchment around Kabul—one place the largely hapless Karzai government was thought to have control of—are clear signals that the conflict that many Americans once thought was largely won and the former Secretary of Defense insisted we could “muddle through” has become quite dire. With coalition casualties for 2008 at their highest level since the war’s onset in late 2001, military and diplomatic policy in the region is being fundamentally reevaluated. A policy choice that once seemed inimical to U.S. and allied values, negotiation with the Islamic fundamentalist Taliban, has increasingly come to be viewed as conventional wisdom as to how to bring the situation in Afghanistan under control.

 

The rapid emergence of this policy choice raises a number of important questions about American national security and values. What interests does the U.S. have at stake in Afghanistan? What interests are of the highest priority there, and which is it willing to compromise? How did a policy position that seemed to be anathema to most Americans just a few short years ago become so widely accepted among the foreign policy elite?

 

Ultimately, any discussion about national security and the national interest comes down to a question of values. The very terms “national security” and “national interest” are no more than useless platitudes detached from a shared set of national values. In deciding whether to conduct talks with the Taliban, U.S. policymakers have to decide which national values to prioritize and which to compromise, since value tradeoffs are inevitable in national security decision-making.

 

Most Americans would probably rank the physical security of the (American) state as the most important value at stake in the war in Afghanistan. After all, the stated mission of the U.S. and its allies in the initial invasion was to root out Al Qaeda there and ensure that the country was no longer a haven for terrorism (which entailed toppling the Taliban regime) in order to prevent further attacks on America and its allies. In addition to physical security, other values that Americans would be loath to compromise to any significant extent include the country’s territorial integrity, economic wellbeing (especially in the light of the current financial crisis and recession), and internal democracy. A successful rapprochement with the Taliban that deescalated or ended the war would seemingly be a boon to three of these four “core” values: physical security, economic wellbeing, and internal democracy.

 

The physical security of the U.S. would be bolstered because many of its military forces could be moved out of harm’s way and it would be involved in one less overseas war. Economically, it would be able to devote fewer resources to the military campaign there and more to its internal economic problems. It may also be able to loosen some of the internal restraints on civil liberties associated with the War on Terror that began with the attacks orchestrated out of Afghanistan if that struggle could seemingly be brought to some sort of conclusion, thus augmenting internal democracy. Successful talks with the Taliban, then, would not be inconsistent with America’s most pressing value concerns.

 

But what of the nation’s other, perhaps more high-minded, values? The 2006 U.S. National Security Strategy lists as one of its key goals “[Expanding] the Circle of Development by Opening Societies & Building the Infrastructure of Democracy.” Furthermore, in his 2004 State of the Union Address, President Bush made the following commitment to Afghanistan, “…above all, we will finish the historic work of democracy in Afghanistan…so [that nation] can light the way for others, and help transform a troubled part of the world.” An accommodation with Taliban theocrats hardly seems consistent with rhetoric that seemingly prioritizes “opening societies” and promoting democracy. However, it is important to remember that value tradeoffs are inevitable with questions of national security. It is unlikely that many Americans would place a higher value on external democracy promotion or the United States’ commitment to Afghanistan than the three “core” values listed above. As such, in order to shape a situation in which American troops aren’t dying in a bloody insurgency, Afghanistan is not a global hub for terrorism and the illicit heroin trade, U.S. money isn’t pouring into the region, and American civil liberties aren’t being compromised—essentially a situation in which more central American values are promoted—the U.S. may need to compromise periphery values.

 

So what should U.S. Afghanistan policy look like? Again, the U.S. should not compromise core values of physical security, economic wellbeing, and internal democracy. None of these would be compromised, and they may, in fact be bolstered, by negotiating with the Taliban. However, I would suggest that, while our commitment to external democracy and to Afghanistan are lower priorities than these core values, they are consequential. Any kind of accommodation with the Taliban that seriously compromises Afghan democracy or puts the country back on a path toward the kind of theocracy and/or authoritarianism it lived through prior to 2001 should be avoided. A more democratic Southwest Asia and world is consistent with U.S. values, and the people of Afghanistan have suffered too greatly as a result of the situation shaped by the U.S. for America to completely wash its hands of the country and be content with just any sort of government there. I would even suggest that it would be worth continuing the fight (and thereby compromising to an extent the core values I listed) in order to avoid totally compromising these periphery values.

 

The best policy choice seems to be to hold talks and reach an accommodation with what General David McKiernan, the troop commander for Afghanistan, refers to as the “small-t Taliban,” the elements of the insurgency that “pick up weapons and fight for the Taliban because they are either unemployed…for intra-tribal reasons…because their family is intimidated…for reasons of power” and not for ideological reasons. Nir Rosen, a journalist who actually embedded with the Taliban, points to elements of the insurgency that are more concerned with Afghan infrastructure than any ideological goal, that seem to envision a peaceful future for Afghanistan, and seem to be more tolerant of variations within Islam and hold more moderate views on the role of women in society than the hard-line Taliban leadership. If the U.S. and its allies can reach out to and accommodate these portions of the insurgency while eschewing accommodation with the Taliban’s theocratic leadership, they may be able to defend core values while not completely abandoning periphery values.

[dubq 0]

I don't want to derail your thread but I just have a comment: they really need to think of a new word other than "pirates" when it comes to describing these people. All I can think of are 'yarrrgh' type pirates with eye patches and shoulder-parrots..

 

That's all. Carry on.

[Dr. Tyler; Captain America 0]

i don't know about you, but i firmly believe that's who they are

[Big Ol' Smitty 0]

Xavier C. says privateers.

[Xavier Cromartie 0]

I'll assume that the question is in regard to Somali "pirates," whom I regard as distinct from other pirates (Indonesian, Thai, and others). My answer is philosophical, not legal.

 

Since ship owners have started hiring security when they pass through the Gulf of Aden,^[1] obviously the pirates are some sort of security threat. But are they a threat to national security? I would say no. I believe that we should distinguish between national security, public security, and private security.

 

I believe that in order to be a threat to (inter)national security, pirates would have to present a direct threat to the territory or an institution of a government. For example, robbing a bank is a matter of national security because it is a threat to a financial institution, whereas robbing an individual on the street is a matter of public security because it is a threat to the safety of an individual person, and robbing an empty home is a matter of private security because it is a threat to the property and assets of a person.

 

Therefore, as long as pirates target ships that are not owned by any government, it is not an issue of national security. Is it an issue of public security and/or private security? One could argue that by "holding the ships' crews hostage," the pirates deprive them of freedom and therefore are a public security threat. But, I would use the analogy of a flight crew and passengers. When a flight crew refuses to let off a passenger mid-flight, are they depriving the passenger of freedom, or does the safety of everyone on the flight override the passenger's desire? Obviously, the latter is correct. I would argue that the pirates are looking out for the safety of the ships' crews. If they let off the crews in Eyl or Xarardheere, the crews would be left to survive on their own in Somalia. If they let off the crews at sea, they might never get rescued or they might get caught in a battle between the pirates and foreign vessels. Since the pirates are not violent toward crews and make sure that they are fed and safe, I believe that they are not a public security threat.

 

The pirates are a threat to private security. Their purpose is to be a private security threat. They are a threat to private property (the ship itself and the crews' personal belongings, but not the contents of the vessels) and to private assets (the wealth of the ships' owners).

 

But are these actions illegal? I believe in respecting the legal system of Somalia. In 2006, The Islamic Courts Union used their authority to stop pirate attacks.^[2] I accept the ICU's actions. I don't consider the TFG to be legitimate. It was created by foreign nations for foreign nations.^[3]

 

During the American Revolution, American privateering "became an industry born of necessity that encouraged patriotic private citizens to harass British shipping while risking their lives and resources for financial gain."^[4] I would say that Somalis, who are "desperate to survive,"^[5] are authorized by the Xeer and the Puntland regional government^[5] to act as privateers in response to the illegal toxic dumping and trawling off of their coastline.^[6]

[Nightwing 0]

Godzilla Crisis Simulation? You have a link to an explanation for that, 'cause I'd love to see it.

[Big Ol' Smitty 0]

Godzilla Crisis Simulation? You have a link to an explanation for that, 'cause I'd love to see it.

 

I talked about it in General Chat...there's a thread.

[ultradust 0]

I was part of the massive Philippine layoff of Jan 15 - around 1000 employees of 2 large US companies lost their jobs in a single day. There was even talk of a local outsourcing company who simply shutdown unannounced. There was crying in the city at that time --good thing I had internet income running 2 months before --so I really wasn't worried like the rest who had to contend with a new larger job market looking for scarce jobs. 1000 people may be small compared to the US - but this is the first time this has happened to the Philippines!

 

In the meetings of the "fired people, I felt I had to extend a hand and said "Why don't they visit my website - http://www.jomarhilario.com - I teach a free three month lesson via email on how to create income using blogs." Though I was shy at first, I think they really needed to know that there options out there. Specially now. I extend the same invite to you. Once your anger or disbelief is over. Signup to my blog and start learning the step by step lessons that enabled me to smile when things are grim.

 

 

[Twisted Intestine 0]

OMGOMGOMG BANBANBANBAN!

 

Where's the repot button when I need it?