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Jingus    0

Jingus
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Aw god, I'd reppressed those dark memories of some former "friends" making me watch Flavor of Love with them, and now the flashbacks have come flooding in like a tidal wave.

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Copper Feel    0

Copper Feel
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It's time, time, time. And it's time, time, time. And it's time, time, time that you love. Yes, it's time, time, time.

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Xavier Cromartie    0

Xavier Cromartie
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On Omniscience and Immutability

by Xavier Cromartie

 

Are the divine attributes of omniscience and immutability compatible? In “Omniscience and Immutability,” Norman Kretzmann argues that these two attributes are incompatible; therefore, “there is no perfect being” (Kretzmann, 367). After briefly presenting his main argument, Kretzmann responds to seven surmised objections. The goal of this essay is to set out and analyze Kretzmann’s arguments.

 

Kretzmann first sets out his argument on the incompatibility of omniscience and immutability in a perfect being. Roughly, the argument is as follows: a perfect being knows everything and is not subject to change. A being that knows everything always knows what time it is; thus, that being is subject to change. But this implication contradicts the premise of the immutability of a perfect being. Therefore, there is no perfect being (Kretzmann, 366-367).

 

Before examining the specific objections, I will mention a few of Kretzmann’s notes. First, he uses the argument that a perfect being must be immutable because a mutable being would be “a being merely potential and not fully actualized” (Kretzmann, 366). Second, he says that a perfect being must know everything, since knowing less than what is possible to know is surely a not perfection. Third, “a being that knows everything always knows what time it is” seems like a logical truth (Kretzmann, 367). Even without reading Kretzmann’s further note, we should recognize that the most debatable premise of Kretzmann’s argument is the fourth premise: “a being that always knows what time it is is subject to change” (Kretzmann, 366).

 

The first objection that Kretzmann raises against his own argument attacks this fourth premise. The objection is that “change in the object of knowledge does not entail change in the knower” (Kretzmann, 367). Kretzmann’s reply is that this statement is true but imprecise. Using his example of the Chrysler Building, Kretzmann says that the object of his knowledge is not the building itself but the height of the building. If the height of the building changes, then either he will no longer know the height of the building or he will have to change his belief in order to have knowledge.

 

A consequence of Kretzmann’s argument is that it seems that a perfect being cannot know the height of the Chrysler Building now unless He is subject to change. For if a perfect being knows that the Chrysler Building is 1046 feet, and 40 feet are added to it, then either a perfect being is not omniscient because He does not know that the Chrysler Building is now 1086 feet, or else He is not immutable, because He would have changed in order to have learned that the Chrysler Building is now 1086 feet. From this example it can be inferred that only if He is mutable can a perfect being know the status of anything now. Thus, a perfect being is not really a perfect being.

 

In “Omniscience and Indexical Reference,” Hector-Neri Castañeda considers Kretzmann’s reply to this objection. Castañeda says that the problem with the argument is that it “is based on indexical references” (Castañeda, 382). More specifically, it is based on “Kretzmann’s own indexical references to [times] t1 and t2 and does not imply that [a perfect being] referred to t1 and t2 indexically” (Castañeda, 379). For a perfect being to know the same propositions at t1 as He knows at t2, Kretzmann’s argument should be formulated “without the word ‘now.’” Castañeda’s solution is to use the word ‘then,’ which he calls a quasi-indicator, instead of ‘now’ (Castañeda, 380). From here, Castañeda uses a trivial principle that states, in summary, that if person Y knows that Z, and if X knows that Y knows that Z, then X and Y “know the very same proposition about” Z.

 

In regard to the issue of the first objection, Castañeda removes the indexical references from Kretzmann’s argument. He says, “Kretzmann knows [or would know] at t1 that: the Chrysler Building is 1046 feet high” then, and “knows [or would know] at t2 that the Chrysler Building is 1086 feet high then” (Castañeda, 382). If this situation obtains, then “Kretzmann knows of the change in height without having to change his knowledge” (Castañeda, 382). Kretzmann’s knowledge does not change because, at t1, Kretzmann knows that at t2 the Chrysler Building is 1086 feet high then. And if a perfect being knows that Kretzmann knows of the change in height without having to change his knowledge, then, in this case, a perfect being may be immutable.

 

There is nothing obviously problematic about Castañeda’s view of change of knowledge. But, even if Castañeda’s view is correct, it does not apply to the entirety of Kretzmann’s argument. As Castañeda states, “at t2 Kretzmann can use words like ‘now’ and ‘present’ to refer to the height of the Chrysler Building, words that were not available to him at t1. But this is an entirely different issue” (Castañeda, 382). This notion of the present will be elaborated in the section concerning the third objection.

 

The second objection that Kretzmann supposes might be raised against his argument also attacks the fourth premise. This objection is that “a change in a being’s beliefs need not constitute a change in the being itself” (Kretzmann, 368). That is to say, taking into account the change in something else, such as the time, should not be considered a change in the being. Kretzmann’s response accepts the judgment that this change is not a change in attitude but is still a sort of change, since an immutable being could not take into account the change in time.

 

Again, the consequences of this claim, which Kretzmann does not explicitly state, should be outlined. For a perfect being to take into account any change in time, He must change. Thus, for a perfect being to know that the current time is not the first moment of time, He must change by taking into account the change in time. If, because of His immutability, He does not change, then He loses His knowledge of what time it presently is. Therefore, either He is not immutable or not omniscient—an alternative that implies His imperfection.

 

This objection mostly complements the first one; Castañeda’s view applies to this one as well. A perfect being knows at t1 that it is December 1965 then, and at t2 that it is January 1966 then. He knows these facts without having to change His knowledge. Again, however, this knowledge does not incorporate the notion of the present that will be examined in the next objection.

 

The third objection hypothesized by Kretzmann also attacks the fourth premise, by claiming that “it is possible for an omniscient being to know the state of the universe at every instant all at once” (Kretzmann, 369). Kretzmann replies that this statement is ambiguous and incomplete. An omniscient being may at once know both when it is that Kretzmann is born and when it is that Kretzmann dies. Kretzmann’s point, however, is that an omniscient being does not know what Kretzmann’s status is now: viz., that the year is now 2009; thus, Kretzmann is dead.

 

In his reply Kretzmann offers an example of a movie that is being shown at a distant theater. Even for a being who knows every frame of the movie, this being lacks the knowledge of one important thing: what the audience is seeing now (Kretzmann, 370). The key question regarding this objection, and also to the entire argument that Kretzmann sets out, is whether or not there really is a now, or a specialness to the present time. Modern discussion about the reality of time is usually based on an argument presented by J.M.E. McTaggart and on the subsequent B-theory and A-theory.

 

McTaggart’s argument is based on “two sets of concepts for ordering times and their contents” (Loux, 251). These sets are the A-series, in which events are ordered in terms of past, present, and future, and the B-series, in which events are ordered in terms of being earlier or later than other events (Loux, 251). McTaggart then argues that time is unreal. The first part of his argument, summarized, is that if there is time, then there is change; if there is change, then there is an A-series; therefore, if there is time, then there is an A-series (Brown). In the second part of his argument, McTaggart argues that it is a contradiction that “each event is past, present, and future,” because these are incompatible properties (Loux, 253). Therefore, by simple modus tollens, if there is no A-series (because it is impossible for there to be an A-series), then there is no time. Thus, time is unreal.

 

The B-theory and A-theory refer to two types of responses to McTaggart’s argument. B-theorists deny the first part of McTaggart’s argument, by denying that there must be an A-series instead of a B-series. On the New Tenseless Theory version of the B-theory, tensed sentences can be properly translated into tenseless sentences. For example, “an utterance or inscription of ‘it is now 2009’ is true just in case it occurs in 2009” (Loux, 258). If B-theory is correct, then the attributes of omniscience and immutability would not be incompatible, because there would not be any particular moment that is ‘now.’

 

Conversely, A-theorists reject the second part of McTaggart’s argument by denying that past, present, and future are incompatible properties and by affirming that there is a special realness to what is going on now. Since this view is the one with which Kretzmann presumably agrees, further defense and analysis of this view should be presented.

 

One such defense of A-theory is found in Arthur Prior’s “The Notion of the Present.” Prior’s thesis is that it is a mistake to suggest that the real world “is just a region of some larger universe [that] contains other regions as well—possible worlds, imaginary worlds, and so on” (Prior, 289). This claim is made because Prior believes that there is specialness about the present, which is real. Imaginary worlds, possible worlds, and, most importantly, the past and future, are unreal. He reasons that a sentence about the real world does not require a “modifying prefix” that a sentence about an unreal world does (Prior, 290). For example, in the sentence, “The Greeks imagine that there are centaurs,” the modifying prefix “the Greeks imagine that” is necessary in order to show that centaurs do not exist in the real world. Concerning time, a sentence about the unreal past, such as “It [was] the case that I am teaching,” also requires a prefix. A sentence about the present, however, can be simply stated as, “I am teaching” (Prior, 291). There is no prefix because this statement is one about the real world, which is “special.”

 

And so, if one can show that A-theory is unsound, (an act that I will now attempt to do,) then Kretzmann, Prior, and other A-theorists cannot take for granted that there is such a thing as ‘now.’ The key issue is Prior’s usage of prefixes. By ‘prefix,’ Prior essentially means ‘main clause.’ In the sentence, “The Greeks imagine that there are centaurs,” the main clause is “the Greeks imagine that,” while the subordinating clause is “there are centaurs.” Here the subordinate clause tells what the Greeks imagine; so in this case there is no problem with claiming that a statement about the unreality of centaurs’ existence requires a ‘prefix’ or main clause. The issue raised by Prior, however, is whether or not a main clause is necessary when the subordinate clause tells what is. In the sentences “it was/will be the case that I am teaching,” Prior includes the main clauses. Yet in the sentence, “I am teaching,” Prior omits the main clause “it is the case that,” merely because it is ‘redundant.’ A subordinate clause, however, must be attached to a main clause in order to give the subordinate clause meaning. For example, in the sentence, “It will be the case that I am teaching,” the subordinate clause tells what will be the case. But if the main clause “It is the case that” is not attached to the sentence “I am teaching,” then the clause “I am teaching” loses its meaning, because it does not express the complete thought, and, thus, does not tell what is the case (in reality.) If Prior must add “it is the case that” to “I am teaching,” then his belief that only unreal sentences need prefixes is false. Thus, he has not shown why the present is real and the past and future are not; so there is no reason to assume that there is such a thing as ‘now.’

 

Although Kretzmann may assume that there is a ‘now’ in the remaining responses to the objections, I will avoid repeating this reply; instead, I will look for other errors in Kretzmann’s reasoning.

 

The fourth objection that Kretzmann raises against himself is that “a perfect being transcends space and time. Such a being is therefore not subject to change” (Kretzmann, 371). Kretzmann says that this objection can be interpreted in two ways. The first is that a perfect being is like the number two, because a perfect being does not age. Kretzmann says that he does not disagree with that view, but that under that interpretation “the doctrine begs the question of premise four” (Kretzmann, 371). The other interpretation is the following: “the passage of time is a universal human illusion”—a view that “implies that either there are no true propositions of the form ‘it is now tn’ or that there is exactly one eternally true proposition of that form” (Kretzmann, 372). Therefore, premise three, which states that an omniscient being always knows what time it is, “either is vacuous or has a single trivializing instance, and premise four is false” (Kretzmann, 372). Kretzmann replies that making the universe immutable is “an inconceivably high price to pay, in the view of Christians and non-Christians alike” (Kretzmann, 372).

 

There are two points to make concerning Kretzmann’s reply. The first regards his reply to the first interpretation. He states that this interpretation begs the question, but there he ends his discussion of this interpretation. A brief explanation about how it is that this question-begging occurs would clarify his view. The objection to Kretzmann basically says that something can change only if it exists in time, but because a perfect being is outside of time, it cannot change. This assertion is an instance of begging the question because the conclusion that a perfect being cannot change is based on the assumption that something can change only if it exists in time—a premise that Kretzmann denies.

 

The second point regards the second interpretation. Kretzmann says that the idea that time is unreal is an “inconceivably high price to pay, in the view of Christians and non-Christians alike” (Kretzmann, 372). He mentions problems that Christians would encounter, such as the incompatibility of the doctrine of the unreality of time with the doctrines of the Incarnation and the Resurrection (Kretzmann, 372). Why, however, does Kretzmann add that this view is undesirable for non-Christians as well? No hint of an explanation is given. Furthermore, even if Kretzmann were to explain why this view would be undesirable for certain groups, he would not have said anything about the possibility that time is unreal.

 

The remaining objections against Kretzmann—objections that he also raises against himself—focus on the principles of immutability and omniscience. The fifth objection is that it is logically impossible for a being that transcends time to know the current time, but “it is no limitation on a perfect being that it cannot do what is logically impossible” (Kretzmann, 372). Therefore, a perfect being does not need to know the current time. Kretzmann replies by giving counter-examples. One such example is that it is logically impossible for a human being to live forever; therefore, it is no limitation on a human being that he must die (Kretzmann, 372). Kretzmann says that the problem is that the “crucial limitation” has already been introduced, and it is not an additional limitation that a human being must die.

 

The point of Kretzmann’s reply is that (1) a perfect being, because of its transcendence of time, is not omniscient and that (2) the reason that it is logically impossible for a perfect being to be omniscient is that its knowledge is limited because of this transcendence of time. Therefore, a perfect being is not a perfect being—a conclusion that entails that there is no perfect being.

 

Kretzmann seems to have a strong reply to this hypothesized objection. If one says that the only limitation on a perfect being is that it cannot do what is logically impossible for it to do, then by analogy a human being could be a perfect being. For it is not logically possible for a human being to know everything, live forever, etc.; but if the inability to do what is logically impossible is not a limitation on perfection, then evidently a human being is a perfect being. But, as Kretzmann said, this idea is ridiculous, since these logical impossibilities are just consequences of imperfections in human beings.

 

While this particular objection seems to fail, there are some escape routes that one could take. The first route is to retract the admission that transcendence of time makes it logically impossible for a perfect being to know what time it is now. The second route is to deny that there is such a thing as a constantly changing present time. These ideas are discussed elsewhere in this paper, when they are more relevant.

 

The sixth objection is that instead of saying that a perfect being knows everything except what is logically impossible, one should say that “a perfect being knows everything the knowing of which does not impair its perfection” (Kretzmann, 373). Since knowing the present time impairs the perfection of a perfect being, omniscience does not require knowing the present time.

 

Kretzmann offers a lengthy reply to this presumed objection. His initial response is that the objection involves another view that comes at a high price, because, on that view, “it is impossible for a perfect, omniscient being to know what is going on” (Kretzmann, 373). Kretzmann then turns to the notion of omnipotence. He sets out three types of provisos, exemplified in three formulas characterizing omnipotence. He focuses, however, on this aspect: “a being that is absolutely perfect … can do anything provided that … the doing of it does not constitute a violation of some aspects of its perfection other than its power” (Kretzmann, 373-374). An example is its being impossible for a perfect being to lie because “its absolute perfection in another aspect—perfect goodness—necessitates its refraining from the exercise of that power” (Kretzmann, 374). He then applies this format to the issue of immutability and omniscience, which would thus state: “although … [a perfect] being, as omniscient, has the power to know what is going on, the exercise of that power would violate the immutability of the being” (Kretzmann, 374). Kretzmann says that the problem with this statement is that omniscience is not a power; omniscience is “the condition of knowing everything” (Kretzmann, 375). Therefore, because the condition of not knowing what is going on now does constitute a violation of some aspects of a perfect being’s perfection other than its power, a perfect being is not a perfect being.

 

Although Kretzmann dedicates considerable time to this objection, he does not really propose anything new. His main point just says that his argument is not that the ability to be omniscient is incompatible with immutability but that the condition of being omniscient is incompatible with immutability. It is true, by definition, that omniscience is the condition of knowing everything. Here Kretzmann emphasizes his conclusion that the condition of knowing everything is incompatible with the condition of being immutable. So, Kretzmann’s defense against this argument is successful, but this success comes merely because the objector had misunderstood (or evaded) Kretzmann’s conclusion (Kretzmann, 375). Kretzmann still must address the problems involving his fourth premise—problems that were outlined earlier in this paper.

 

The seventh and last objection that Kretzmann responds to is the only one that challenges the first premise: viz., the premise that a perfect being is immutable. The claim here is that the “traditional view” of immutability is mistaken, because it is “founded on the misconception that in a perfect being any change has to be for the worse” (Kretzmann, 375). Since always knowing what time it is would not be deterioration, perfection actually “entails mutability in at least this one respect” (Kretzmann, 375). Kretzmann replies by stating: “an absolutely perfect being may be described as a being possessing all logically compossible perfections” (Kretzmann, 375). Kretzmann argues, however, that omniscience and immutability have not been shown to be logically incompossible but, instead, are only really incompossible. Therefore, the being described in this objection is “the best of all really possible beings” (Kretzmann, 375). This best really possible being is not the same as the absolutely perfect being whose existence Kretzmann has denied; so the objection is irrelevant.

 

Kretzmann seems to have another strong argument against this objection—an argument that, actually, seems like it could be developed further. He states, rather curiously, that “if as a matter of fact nothing else ever did change, an omniscient being could of course remain immutable” (Kretzmann, 375). He does not elaborate on this point. It seems, however, that another argument against the objection relates to this one. In The City of God, XII, 16, St. Augustine says: “There was a time when this time did not exist. … [God] existed before His Creation, although not in any time before it” (St. Augustine, 492). Before Creation, a perfect being would not have had to be mutable in order to know “what time it is now,” because this time did not exist. After Creation, however, this time came into existence. According to the objection, a perfect being would indeed have to be mutable in order to know what time it is now, but this mutability constitutes no deterioration. The problem here is that deterioration is not limited only to knowing what time it is now. There is also the issue that before this time existed, absolute perfection did not entail mutability, whereas after this time began to exist, absolute perfection, and therefore omniscience, did entail mutability. This outcome appears to show deterioration.

 

In conclusion, Kretzmann seems to answer satisfactorily the objections that he raises against his first and second premises (objections 5–7). However, his replies to the objections against his fourth premise (objections 1–4) are not completely satisfactory. The two main residual issues that he must deal with are the proper usage of indexical references and the legitimacy of the commonsensical assumption that there is such a thing as ‘now.’

 

Sources

 

Brown, Curtis. “Time – Notes on McTaggart, ‘The Unreality of Time.’” University of Trinity. ( http://www.trinity.edu/cbrown/time/mctaggart.html )

 

Castañeda, Hector-Neri. “Omniscience and Indexical Reference.” The Journal of Philosophy 64, 1967. Reprinted in Readings in the Philosophy of Religion: An Analytic Approach. Ed. Baruch A. Brody. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1974. 377-384.

 

Kretzmann, Norman. “Omniscience and Immutability.”The Journal of Philosophy 63, 1966. Reprinted in Readings in the Philosophy of Religion: An Analytic Approach. Ed. Baruch A. Brody. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1974. 366-376.

 

Loux, Michael. Metaphysics: Contemporary Readings. New York: Routledge, 2001. 251-259.

 

Prior, Arthur. “The Notion of the Present.” Metaphysics: Contemporary Readings. Ed. Michael Loux. New York: Routledge, 2001: 289-293.

 

St. Augustine. The City of God. London: Penguin, 1984.

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